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Brexit negotiations are in full swing. A main point of contention involves the freedom 
of movement of EU citizens. To explore the legal basis and limitations of a key EU 
right, we interviewed Federico Fabbrini, Professor of European Law. 
 
 
The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union has once more propelled the 
freedom of movement of people to the forefront 
of discussions. Against the backdrop of the 
ongoing Brexit negotiations, we take a closer 
look at the legal basis of one of the cornerstones 
of EU integration. What does the concept of 
freedom of movement imply? Who benefits from 
it? What legal and practical options are there to 
control the movement of people across EU 
borders? And what does Brexit mean in this 
context? 
 
 
Legal basis of the freedom of 
movement  
What is the legal basis for the freedom of 
movement in the EU? And what does it say? 
The right to free movement of individuals in the 
European Union finds it legal basis in the EU 
Treaties, which have been implemented through 
EU legislation. Article 45 TFEU recognizes a 
specific right to free movement for workers, while 
Article 21 TFEU more generally proclaims that 
every citizen of the Union shall have the right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the 
member states – subject to the limitations and 
conditions defined by EU legislation. These 
limitations and conditions have been set by the 
so-called European Citizenship Directive 
(Directive 2004/38/EC). According to this 
directive, EU citizens have an unlimited right to 
move to another member state and reside there 
for up to 90 days. If they want to reside in 
another member state for longer than 90 days 
EU citizens must register with the local 
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authorities and have sufficient resources not to 
become a burden on the social assistance 
system of the host state. This includes having 
comprehensive health insurance. However, if an 
EU citizen moves to another member state as a 
worker, special rules apply that are codified in a 
specific regulation on the freedom of movement 
of workers (Regulation EU/492/2011).  
 
So there are effectively different rules 
depending on whether you move as a citizen 
or as a worker? 
EU law effectively establishes two regimes for 
free movement: A more specific and more 
permissive one for workers; and a more generic, 
but more restrictive one for EU citizens. This is 
the result of the historical evolution of the right to 
free movement of persons in EU law. Initially, the 
Treaties of Rome in 1957 recognized only a right 
of free movement for workers. This right reflected 
a market-driven logic to promote the free 
circulation of labour, in conjunction with the free 
movement of the other factors of production: 
goods, services and capital. Over time, however, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) extended 
the list of beneficiaries of the right to free 
movement through its case law – including 
students, job seekers and self-employed 
individuals. The ECJ’s removal of obstacles to 
free movement prompted legislative action to 
regulate the issue. With the Treaty of Maastricht 
of 1992 and the creation of European citizenship 
– a major step towards a federal EU – free 
movement was transformed from simple market 
logic into a right belonging to every citizen of the 
EU, even if subject to certain restrictions as 
described above. 
 
Apart from legal aspects, there are practical 
barriers to free movement, for example the 
portability of benefits. What proposals to 
reduce them are currently on the table? 
There are a number of factors – such as 
language barriers – that certainly render free 
movement across states more complicated in the 
EU than, say, in the United States. Nevertheless, 
obstacles toward free movement are produced 
also by uncertainties regarding the portability of 
benefits and pensions. After almost a decade of 
deliberation the European Parliament and the 
Council agreed in 2014 on the revised text of a 
Commission proposal for a directive on the 
portability of pension rights (Directive 
2014/50/EU) to improve workers’ mobility across 
the Union as a whole. Member states have until 
May 2018 to implement the directive within their 
domestic legal systems. It remains to be seen 
how national administrations involved in 
managing pension systems will ultimately 
change their practices to make it easier to 
transfer benefits from one EU country to another. 
 
 
The role of the ECJ in shaping free 
movement… 
The ECJ has played a vital role in the 
evolution of freedom of movement. What 
landmark decisions have shaped this right in 
the past? 
The ECJ has played a major role in protecting 
the right to free movement of persons within the 
EU. Beginning in the 1960s, the ECJ started 
extending the list of persons that could benefit 
from the right to free movement of workers set 
out in the treaties. Moreover, since the creation 
of the concept of “European citizenship” in the 
1990s, the ECJ has endeavoured to give 
meaning to the concept by proclaiming in the 
Grzelczyk case of 1999 that “European 
citizenship is destined to become the 
fundamental status of nationals of the member 
states”. To that end, the ECJ has, for example, 
ruled in Martinez Sala (1998) that EU law 
empowers an EU citizen residing in another 
member state to obtain child care benefits 
without having to show a residence permit; it has 
banned in Garcia Avello (2003) national 
legislation that prevents an EU citizen from using 
a double surname when moving to another 
member state; and it has held in Zambrano 
(2011) that EU citizenship entails a substance of 
rights that cannot be violated – a situation that 
would arise if, say, the third-country national 
father of an EU citizen were to be expelled from 
the EU. 
 
All this suggests that the ECJ has been an 
unequivocal force in promoting freedom of 
movement. Is that true? 
The ECJ has been an important player in the 
field of free movement. Nevertheless, the role of 
the ECJ must be qualified in two ways.  
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First, the ECJ has not acted alone in promoting 
free movement of persons. It has rather operated 
in concert with the other EU institutions and 
member states. After all, it was the member 
states who introduced EU citizenship as an 
additional status attaching to “every person 
holding the nationality of a member state” and 
the right to free movement in principle for all EU 
citizens in the Treaties. In addition, rules 
designed to promote the free movement of 
persons such as those on coordinating member 
states’ social security systems (specifically 
Regulation EC/883/2004) have been established 
by EU laws that were adopted by the Council 
and the European Parliament, following the 
normal democratic legislative process – and not 
by judicial fiat. 
Second, the case law of the ECJ on free 
movement of persons has not been linear and 
consistent in promoting free movement. In recent 
times the ECJ has in fact significantly restricted 
its approach to freedom of movement, allowing 
member states to limit the ability of EU citizens to 
move. In particular, departing from precedents 
like Martinez Sala, the ECJ held in Dano (2014) 
and Alimanovic (2015) that member states may 
refuse to grant social benefits to economically 
inactive Union citizens who exercise their right to 
freedom of movement solely so as to obtain 
another member state’s welfare benefits 
although they do not have sufficient resources to 
claim a right of residence. Moreover, less than 
ten days before the Brexit referendum in June 
2016, the ECJ explicitly ruled in Commission v 
United Kingdom that “there is nothing in EU law 
to prevent the granting of social benefits to EU 
citizens who are not economically active being 
made subject to the substantive condition that 
those citizens meet the necessary requirements 
for possessing a right to reside lawfully in the 
host state.” In other words, member states can 
effectively exclude EU citizens who are illegally 
present on their territory from accessing social 
benefits. 
 
 
… and what EU member states 
make of it 
Current EU legislation already allows national 
governments to limit movement of people in 
the EU. To what extent do countries make 
use of this right? 
Here we face a paradox. The EU is often 
criticized – particularly in the United Kingdom – 
for undermining member states’ sovereignty in 
the field of immigration and promoting welfare 
tourism. The reality is different: EU legislation 
actually allows member states to restrict free 
movement of persons, and the ECJ has been 
fairly permissive as of late in granting member 
states more leeway in these matters. The 
existence of a border-free Schengen zone 
certainly complicates the ability of national 
governments to monitor the movement of EU 
citizens. However, the UK did not join the 
Schengen area. 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that national 
governments often encourage free movement, 
and take advantage of it. The UK is a case in 
point: Following the enlargement of the EU to 
Central and Eastern European countries, it – 
unlike other older EU member states – decided 
not to apply temporary restrictions on the free 
movement of persons, which the 2003 Accession 
Protocol of Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, the Baltics, Slovenia, Malta 
and Cyprus (and later the Accession Protocol of 
Bulgaria and Romania) permitted for a 
transitional period of up to seven years. 
 
Why have governments encouraged freedom 
of movement of people in the past? 
The decision of the British government was at 
that time mainly motivated by economic reasons, 
as the UK economy was expanding but facing a 
labour shortage. Nevertheless UK’s policy can 
also be seen in terms of fairness: free movement 
of persons cannot be disjoined from free 
movement of goods, services and capital since 
the combination is a constitutional compromise. 
Because of the varieties of capitalism in Europe, 
older EU member states, with their advanced 
economies, are able to take advantage of an 
expanding EU common market, because they 
can export their goods and services to new 
member states that have less competitive and 
technologically advanced production processes. 
In this context, it seems only fair that older 
member states open at least their labour markets 
to the workforce of the new member states. Any 
higher social welfare cost this may entail for 
them should be more than made up for by the 
higher economic benefits – and consequential 
flashlight europe 07/2017:Brexit and Freedom of Movement in the EU: A legal primer | page 4 
 
tax revenues – they obtain precisely from their 
ability to make use of a larger common market. 
 
Even though the economic benefits of intra-
EU migration have been documented time 
and again, political support for the freedom 
of movement seems to have faded in some 
countries. How did this happen? 
The matter has been highly contentious and has 
influenced outcomes of elections and referenda. 
The fear of the “Polish plumber” spelt doom for 
the European Constitution in the French 2005 
referendum. And the willingness to prevent wage 
competition has recently renewed calls in Paris 
to revise the so-called Posted Workers Directive 
(Directive 97/71/EC). This piece of legislation 
allows companies established in any EU member 
state to post employees to work in other EU 
member states under the labour regulations set 
in the home state. In practical terms, the directive 
has empowered companies in newer member 
states across Central and Eastern Europe to 
take advantage of their cheaper labour costs 
when offering services in the older member 
states. For the former, the Posted Workers 
Directive is seen as a fair instrument to allow 
newcomers to capitalize on their business model, 
while for the latter it is often considered an 
instrument for social dumping, ultimately 
undermining the work guarantees set in national 
laws and collective agreements. In 2016, the 
European Commission indicated its intention to 
revise the directive, but it remains unclear how 
far the member states may agree on this. 
 
Brexit and the freedom of 
movement  
Freedom of movement was one of the most 
hotly debated issues in the Brexit campaign. 
What concessions did the “better deal” 
between the EU and the UK in the run-up to 
the referendum entail? 
Control of immigration was one of the four items 
– together with sovereignty, competitiveness and 
the protection of the interests of non-Eurozone 
member states – that British Prime Minister 
David Cameron put on his wish-list for 
renegotiating the UK’s status within the EU. The 
European Council went out of its way to 
accommodate the British demands. In the “New 
Settlement for the UK within the EU” reached in 
February 2016, the heads of state and 
government compromised on important 
principles of EU law: among other things, they 
granted the UK exemption from participating in 
the process of an “ever closer union”. In the field 
of migration, in particular, the European Council 
committed to introduce an alert and safeguard 
mechanism into EU law – the so-called 
“emergency brake” – that would have allowed a 
member state to restrict free movement of 
persons for up to seven years in the event of an 
exceptional inflow of workers from other EU 
member states. Moreover, the European 
Commission already indicated in a declaration 
annexed to the New Settlement that the 
conditions for invoking the emergency brake 
were fulfilled by the UK. On top of this, the 
Commission also pre-committed itself to propose 
new EU legislation that would have allowed 
member states to index child benefits for migrant 
workers to the standard of living of their home 
state, and that would have further restricted the 
possibility of third country nationals married to 
EU citizens to move and reside freely in another 
EU member state. 
 
Why did the deal that the EU and Prime 
Minister David Cameron negotiated fail? 
In the end, these concessions did not work. As is 
well known, on 23 June 2016 the UK voted to 
leave the EU. As a result, the settlement 
between the UK and the EU became null and 
void. It is unclear whether the special deal that 
Prime Minister Cameron had obtained from its 
European partners really played a role in the 
Brexit referendum campaign. Although the 
concessions that the UK government received, 
particularly in the field of free movement, were 
rather substantial, the referendum campaign was 
hijacked by populist slogans. Moreover, decades 
of “Brussels bashing” by all UK political parties 
and the media arguably could not reverse the 
long-standing anti-EU criticism in just a few 
weeks of campaigning. Be that as it may, the 
burial of the New Settlement should be welcome, 
as that deal would have significantly weakened 
the foundations of the EU legal order. In fact, the 
European Council seems now to have come to 
its senses again. Following the decision of the 
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UK to leave the EU, the European Council 
President Donald Tusk has stated that the UK as 
a non-member cannot have the same benefits as 
an EU member state. Moreover, the European 
Council made clear in its April 2017 guidelines 
for the withdrawal negotiations that the four 
freedoms of the single market are indivisible and 
there cannot be any cherry picking by the UK. 
This means that a possible free trade deal 
between the UK and the EU covering free 
movement of goods, capital and services would 
also have to include free movement of persons. 
Ironically, therefore, Brexit may have reinforced 
the commitment of the remaining EU-27 toward 
free movement of persons. 
 
Post-Brexit scenarios for free 
movement in the EU 
As the UK and the EU negotiate over Brexit, 
different scenarios have been discussed. 
What legal options are there for freedom of 
movement under the different scenarios? 
First of all, it will not be easy for the two parties 
to strike a deal: Judging from the European 
Council’s April 2017 Guidelines for the 
withdrawal negotiations and the UK 
governments’ statements (notably the February 
2017 White Paper on the UK’s exit from and new 
partnership with the EU), their positions lie far 
apart. On the one hand, the European Council 
has been explicit in affirming that the four 
freedoms are indivisible and there can be no 
compromise on free movement of persons. On 
the other hand, the British Prime Minister 
Theresa May has interpreted Brexit as mostly a 
sovereigntist call to “take back control” and 
therefore asserted the UK plan to restore full 
autonomy in the field of migration, getting rid of 
the jurisdiction of the ECJ. If these positions are 
maintained, the scenario of a so-called “hard 
Brexit” with no deal between the UK and the EU 
becomes a serious possibility. Should this 
happen, post-Brexit relations between the UK 
and the EU would be regulated by World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules. While EU tariffs under 
the WTO schedule are on average fairly low, 
WTO rules cover almost only trade in goods, 
which would significantly reduce the ability of the 
UK to import labour and export services. 
 
Why did the UK government advance a 
proposed model of close association for a 
time-limited interim period? 
Given the risks of a hard Brexit, particularly after 
the June 2017 snap British general election that 
deprived the Conservative Party of its majority in 
the House of Commons, calls have grown louder 
for the UK to embrace a more accommodating 
position vis-à-vis the EU. In particular, while the 
UK government has reaffirmed its intention to 
conclude a new deep and special partnership 
with the EU, in August 2017 it indicated that the 
UK could opt for a model of close association 
with the EU for a time-limited transitional period 
of an indeterminate few years required to 
untangle itself from the EU. Such a solution 
echoes in some respects the calls for the UK to 
join the European Economic Area (EEA) after 
Brexit. Under EEA rules the UK would maintain 
access to the EU single market under the same 
conditions as EU member states, but in 
exchange it would have to contribute to the EU 
budget and permit free movement of persons, 
under the oversight of the ECJ. While neither of 
these conditions seems to accommodate the 
demands of the Brexit supporters, the EEA 
solution would certainly minimize the economic 
costs of Brexit. Moreover, it may offer the 
transitional framework in which the UK and the 
EU can negotiate a free trade deal – a process 
which experience has shown may take up to a 
decade. 
 
What is the current state of debate on 
freedom of movement in the UK and in the 
ongoing Brexit negotiations? 
Much will depend on how the negotiations 
between the UK and the EU unfold over the 
coming weeks and months. During the summer 
of 2017, Michel Barnier, the European 
Commission Chief Negotiator, and David Davis, 
the UK Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, 
started talks to settle the issues connected to 
withdrawal. The two negotiating parties have so 
far focused on the question of citizens’ rights, the 
border between Ireland and Northern Ireland, 
and the UK financial settlement. Yet, owing to 
political uncertainties following the UK snap 
election, negotiations have been slow and the 
two parties have been unable to make much 
progress – even on non-contentious issues like 
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the protection of the rights of EU citizens residing 
in the UK and UK citizens living in the EU. The 
European Council has affirmed that progress on 
the withdrawal issues is a pre-condition for 
starting a preliminary discussion on the future 
relations between the UK and the EU. Any 
delays in the divorce negotiations will therefore 
inevitably postpone or undermine the chances of 
a post-Brexit free trade agreement or even a 
more comprehensive political partnership 
between the EU and the UK. In this regard, the 
question of free movement of citizens will remain 
one of the key issues to be settled. 
 
What are the implications for freedom of 
movement in the remaining EU-27 after the 
UK has left the EU? Will it be possible to 
uphold the four freedoms in the future? 
Even after the UK’s withdrawal the issue of the 
free movement of people will remain 
controversial in the EU. On the one hand, Brexit 
has united the remaining EU-27 in affirming the 
indivisibility of the four freedoms. On the other 
hand, however, important differences exist 
among the EU member states on the scope that 
free movement should have – for instance with 
regard to the posting of workers, or access to 
social benefits. In these areas, the interests of 
old and new EU member states are mainly at 
odds. It is therefore likely that the issue of free 
movement will become part and parcel of a 
broader discussion on the future of Europe. One 
post-Brexit option for the EU foresees advanced 
forms of enhanced cooperation through a core 
group of member states – possibly the Eurozone 
countries. If the EU proceeded on such lines, the 
regulation of the free movement of persons 
would be a crucial aspect of any future relations 
between the core countries and those EU 
members unwilling to move toward some kind of 
Political Union. 
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